The Sleight of Hand Behind “Chinese-Style Modernization”

The theme of the CCP's Third Plenum of the 20th Central Committee was "advancing Chinese-style modernization," with only a preceding phrase tacked on—"further comprehensively deepening reform." Clearly, the purpose of this so-called "deepening of reform" is to "advance Chinese-style modernization." So once we understand what "Chinese-style modernization" really means, the true meaning of this "reform" becomes clear as well. Like every totalitarian regime, the CCP loves to play verbal sleight of hand—word games that mix truth and falsehood so thoroughly that they simultaneously reveal its real intentions and deceive public opinion. Hitler called his program "National Socialism," in which "socialism" was false, though not entirely false, while "the state" controlling everything was true—indeed, unquestionably true. As for how true or false the "socialism" part was, Chinese-language readers first need to understand what "socialism" actually means, as opposed to what the CCP means by the word—a topic for another time. In Xi Jinping's program today, "reform" is false, though not entirely false, while Chinese-style modernization is true, though not entirely true. Can such a convoluted act really dazzle the eyes of the whole world? I would very much like to try to untangle the mix of truth and falsehood here, but for today I can only address the true and false components of "Chinese-style modernization." “Chinese-Style Modernization” Is Not “Modernization Like Yours” China truly is a remarkable country—it seems that the moment you attach the word "China" to something, that thing no longer means what it originally meant. One might say that "China" has become, in Chinese, a negating modifier. When Deng Xiaoping spoke of "socialism with Chinese characteristics," what he meant was that China would practice capitalism under the banner of socialism. In this way, "socialism"—the very opposite of capitalism—was "characterized" out of existence by the word "Chinese." Deng himself said: "The defining feature of socialism is common prosperity; it does not give rise to an exploiting class" (Chronicle of Deng Xiaoping, 1975–1997, p. 580). One has to ask: does Deng's "socialism with Chinese characteristics" actually display this feature? "Chinese-style modernization" was, in fact, also a phrase Deng Xiaoping first coined, in December 1979. When Japanese Prime Minister Masayoshi Ohira visited and asked Deng how he had conceived his blueprint for China's modernization, Deng replied: "The Four Modernizations we intend to achieve are a Chinese-style modernization; our concept of the Four Modernizations is not the same concept of modernization that you have—it is a 'moderately prosperous society'" (ibid., p. 582). Deng's meaning was unmistakable: Chinese-style modernization is simply not the modernization commonly understood elsewhere in the world. When Deng said this at the time, his focus was on the level of development. He felt it would be very difficult for China to reach the level of modernization commonly understood elsewhere, so he lowered the bar for himself. He repeated this point many times afterward. In late December 1979, he told a Singaporean delegation: "What I mean by the Four Modernizations is that we can only manage a 'moderately prosperous society'—for instance, a per-capita GNP of one thousand US dollars" (ibid., p. 586). In May 1980, he told a former British prime minister: "Our Four Modernizations are different from the modernization of developed countries like Britain. China's population is too large; it is unrealistic to reach the level you have, with per-capita annual income of five to seven thousand US dollars. That is why the modernization we propose is a Chinese-style modernization" (ibid., pp. 631–632). Forty-five years later, China's per-capita GDP has surpassed twelve thousand US dollars, exceeding the world average and approaching the threshold for a high-income economy. Under normal circumstances, China could expect to join the ranks of high-income economies within the next few years, at which point it could be said, by international standards, to have achieved modernization. Yet it is precisely at this juncture that Xi Jinping has revived "Chinese-style modernization" and made it the central theme of his governance—clearly no longer for the reasons Deng had in mind. But using "Chinese-style" to negate universal standards is the same old trick: Chinese-style modernization simply means it is not "modernization like yours."

“Chinese-Style” Means the CCP’s Permanent Monopoly on Power According to Xi Jinping's own account, the first "essential requirement" of "Chinese-style modernization" is "upholding the leadership of the Chinese Communist Party." At the risk of repetition, Xi went on to lay out "five major principles that must be firmly grasped" for Chinese-style modernization, and the first of these is likewise "upholding and strengthening the Party's overall leadership." As noted earlier, in Hitler's "National Socialism," the state's control over everything was unquestionably true. Xi Jinping is determined not to be outdone: in his "Chinese-style modernization," the CCP's monopoly on power is the paramount principle, and it, too, is unquestionably true. In this sense, it follows exactly the same pattern as Hitler's "National Socialism," where the first half is true and the second false: in "Chinese-style modernization," "modernization" is the false part, and "Chinese-style" is the true part. It is clear that Xi Jinping's real purpose in proposing "Chinese-style modernization" is not chiefly to distinguish China's particular level of development from the general requirements of modernization, but rather to worry about, oppose, and resist the prospect that the very dynamics driving modernization might lead the Chinese people toward freedom, rights, and the power to decide who holds state authority. In fact, whether modernization would weaken, challenge, dismantle, or destroy the CCP's one-party dictatorship has been a central question in the debate over China's direction since the late 1970s. From the suppression, in 1979, of calls for the "Fifth Modernization"—political modernization and democratization—to the Tiananmen Massacre of 1989, Deng Xiaoping consistently insisted on defending CCP one-party rule, demanding that reform and modernization proceed only on that premise. After 1989, the CCP struck a certain balance between building a system of "stability maintenance" and embracing globalization, at one point believing it had found the perfect formula for sustaining both political repression and economic prosperity simultaneously. But by the eve of Xi Jinping's rise to power, as the private economy grew, civil society developed, and ties with the outside world deepened, anxiety within the CCP over this model of modernization intensified. In his report to the 20th Party Congress, Xi said: "Ten years ago, we faced a situation in which reform, opening up, and socialist modernization had achieved great success," but "a series of long-accumulated and newly emerging prominent contradictions and problems urgently needed to be resolved," and "at the time, many within the Party and in society were deeply worried about the future of the Party and the nation." What worried them, above all, was that these contradictions and problems would "affect the Party's long-term hold on power." And so Xi Jinping redefined Deng Xiaoping's "Chinese-style modernization," giving rise to the series of policy measures he has pursued over his roughly ten years in power. Interestingly, although the CCP has spent years relentlessly promoting "Chinese-style modernization," churning out hundreds of millions of words of propaganda on the subject, it rarely says much about what "modernization" actually means—it is always talking about what "Chinese-style" means. If "Chinese-style" simply means the CCP's permanent monopoly on power, then why bother invoking "modernization" at all? That question will have to wait for another time.