On May 10 and 11, the first round of US-China trade talks since the outbreak of the tariff war produced a temporary agreement on tariffs. In reality, the CCP made major concessions, returning to the track Trump had originally set on April 2. Trump appeared fairly satisfied; on the 12th he said: "We had a very productive meeting in Geneva yesterday, and we've achieved a total reset of our relationship with China. Relations between the two countries are very, very good — I may speak with President Xi by phone this weekend."

However, the Chinese side and some commentators have claimed this was a major victory for the CCP. This article offers three points of analysis on that question.

First, What Exactly Does the US-China Geneva Joint Statement Say?

By May 14, 2025: (1) the US and China would each cancel the retaliatory tariffs (91%) imposed on and after April 8; (2) of the "reciprocal tariff" (34%) the US rolled out on April 2, the baseline 10% would remain, with the remaining 24% suspended for three months; China's countermeasure "reciprocal tariff" (34%) against the US would be handled the same way.

All of the above is reciprocal. But note that China also took on an additional obligation: to "take necessary measures to suspend or cancel the non-tariff countermeasures against the United States imposed since April 2, 2025." A research report by mainland China's Minsheng Securities summarized the relevant Chinese non-tariff countermeasures as follows:

Moreover, the joint statement does not address: (1) the additional 20% "fentanyl tariff" the US imposed in February and March of this year; or (2) how "de minimis" e-commerce packages shipped from China to the US will be handled. In other words, the US will continue to impose the 20% "fentanyl tariff," and may continue to eliminate the de minimis exemption or lower the relevant tax rate.

In sum, over the next 90 days, the additional tariff level the US imposes on Chinese goods this year will fall from 145% to 30%; the additional tariff level China imposes on US goods this year will fall from 125% to 10%.

Isn't it obvious who has the upper hand here? Do those whitewashing for the CCP think everyone else is blind?

Second, the 91% Retaliatory Tariff Was Never Trump's Original Intent and Was Entirely Avoidable — It Was Provoked by the CCP's Own Countermeasures; After a Month of Tariff War, Things Are Back to Trump's Starting Point, and the CCP Has Only Humiliated Itself

When Trump rolled out "reciprocal tariffs" on April 2, he targeted dozens of economies worldwide, not China alone; and the "reciprocal tariffs" themselves were not the end goal — the aim was to bring everyone to the table for trade talks with the United States, because in 2024 the US goods trade deficit had reached an unprecedented $1.2 trillion. U.S. Treasury Secretary Bessent put it very plainly: "My advice to every country right now is: do not retaliate, do not take action, watch and see how the situation develops. Because if you retaliate, things will escalate. If you don't retaliate, then this is the ceiling on rates."

Seventy or eighty economies actively signaled their willingness to negotiate with the US to resolve the "reciprocal tariff" issue. The CCP, however, misjudged the situation — believing the US would descend into chaos and the world would turn against it — refused to negotiate, and insisted on retaliating, causing the tariff war to escalate sharply. But after a month of tariff war, with the Chinese economy badly battered and infighting within the CCP intensifying, it had no choice but to bow to the US and return to the path of negotiation. Hence the joint statement includes the clause: "The two sides will establish a mechanism to continue consultations on economic and trade relations."

On May 12, Bessent reiterated that the 34% "reciprocal tariff" on China set by the President on April 2 "will be a ceiling"; and that if Beijing cooperates well in addressing America's fentanyl crisis, "we may see some of the fentanyl tariffs come off."

Looking back, wasn't it utterly foolish of the CCP to go toe-to-toe with the US in a tariff war? Had it taken a negotiating stance from the start, would things have come to such an embarrassing and nationally damaging point today?

Third, Trump Still Has Plenty of Ammunition Left, While the CCP Has Few Cards to Play

On May 12, Trump said at the White House: we've achieved a total reset with China, and negotiators will continue discussing the most important structural issues. If the US and China fail to reach a trade deal within 90 days, tariffs on China will rise again, but not back to the 145% level seen before the Geneva talks.

Why won't it go back to the pre-Geneva 145%? Because a tariff that high would amount to a trade embargo, and as long as US-China relations have not completely broken down, the US side is unlikely to make that move.

As for the goals of US tariff policy, Bessent said in an interview on CNBC's "Squawk Box" on May 12 that "we don't want a generalized decoupling from China," but "what we really want is a decoupling in the strategic necessities that we were unable to get during Covid, and we realized that efficient supply chains are not resilient supply chains." "The United States will pursue strategic decoupling in goods where we identified national security interests during Covid — things like semiconductors, medicine, and steel."

US Trade Representative Greer said that sector-specific tariffs are not part of the US-China agreement. Trump has imposed sectoral tariffs on Chinese-made semiconductors, medical devices, and steel and aluminum products. On April 14 and 15, the Trump administration successively announced three "Section 232 investigations" covering semiconductors, pharmaceuticals, and critical minerals, and is very likely to follow up with Section 232 tariffs on these products.

In addition, on April 17, the Office of the US Trade Representative (USTR) announced it would impose steep fees on commercial vessels built and operated by China, while gradually restricting the use of non-US-built vehicle carriers and LNG export vessels.

It's clear that the Trump administration has plenty of ammunition left. How many countermeasures does the CCP have in response? Negotiation is not a contest of bluster — it is a matter of real strength.

It should also be noted that US-China talks are not confined to trade — Trump also intends to use them to pressure the CCP on other fronts. For example, on the eve of the Geneva talks, Trump said in a radio interview that raising the case of Hong Kong media tycoon Jimmy Lai during trade negotiations with the CCP was a very good idea, and that he would bring it into the talks. Of course, much more remains undisclosed by both sides.

All this further reveals the CCP's passivity and helplessness.

Conclusion

Having learned from the experience of his first term, Trump, now back in the White House, has a grand strategy toward China, but executes it with a high degree of flexibility, adapting as circumstances shift. In fact, beyond the tariff war, the Trump administration is also pressing the offensive against the CCP on other fronts — pursuing accountability for the pandemic, having the CIA openly recruit CCP officials, and compiling reports on the wealth and corrupt activities of CCP leaders, among others. So what exactly is Trump's China policy? It should be observed comprehensively and judged in the round.