Last week, Xi Jinping spoke by phone with both Putin and Trump on the same day -- the odds of both leaders independently choosing to call Xi on the very same day should be quite low. Judging from the content of the two calls as released by Beijing, the overall impression is that Xi Jinping wanted a boost from both Putin and Trump. International conditions may offer some explanation, given that “wolf warrior” diplomacy and checkbook diplomacy have already turned from assets into liabilities. But what may deserve even more attention is China's internal situation: although some analysts argue that Xi Jinping's paramount status has only grown more solid since the downfall of Zhang Youxia and Liu Zhenli, the People's Liberation Army's eerie quiet has left outside observers unable to make sense of what is really happening.

Recently, several heads of government from self-styled “middle powers” have visited China one after another. Against this backdrop, Xi Jinping's back-to-back calls with Putin and Trump on the same day highlight continued Sino-Russian strategic coordination and a stabilizing US-China relationship, while the interaction among the three leaders pushed the diplomatic wave of “middle powers” rushing to visit China to a new high. All of this amounts to nothing more than assembling a diplomatic scorecard for Xi Jinping, meant to prove that he is, as Trump put it, “Chairman Xi is the boss.”

Yet the lightning-fast purge of the People's Liberation Army's number-two and number-three generals has still cast a shadow over Xi Jinping's grip on power. When the affair first broke, Zhang Youxia and Liu Zhenli were saddled with five major charges, compounded by a Wall Street Journal report that Zhang had leaked nuclear-weapons secrets to the United States, insulted Xi, undermined the military, engaged in corruption, and committed treason -- crimes utterly unforgivable. Yet as things unfolded, the scope of the purge narrowed, and the narrative began to focus solely on corruption. At just this moment, prominent Chinese investigative journalist Liu Hu and his colleague Wu Yingjiao published an online report concerning a county-level official in Sichuan who had long seized a businessman's property; the article was soon deleted, and the two were criminally detained last week. It turns out that corruption may only be certified by the CCP itself -- the pace of any anti-corruption campaign must remain firmly under official control, with no room for the targets of one-party rule to comment or oversee it themselves.

During this same period, revelations conveniently surfaced concerning Xi's own family, alleging that they had monopolized the import of cheap oil from Venezuela, Iran, and elsewhere, then resold it at a high price to the state-owned enterprise Sinopec, reaping substantial profits. As it happens, Marco Rubio stated more specifically at a Senate hearing that China obtains oil from Venezuela at just twenty dollars a barrel -- and doesn't even need to pay for it, since the oil is used to offset debt. Rumors of alchemy involving the Xi family and the Sinovac vaccine have likewise spread far and wide. Whether these revelations are true or false still awaits further confirmation, and this is merely one strand among many vivid rumors. What can be imagined, however, is that under one-party dictatorship, there is no official who is not corrupt -- and those with an interest in turning the tables on Xi Jinping will hardly let a subject like this go to waste.

Elsewhere, a “Japan contingency” is also brewing trouble. Because of China's diplomatic overreach, Sanae Takaichi's popularity has soared unstoppably, prompting her to dissolve the Diet and call a new election to strengthen her governing base. Sure enough, in the vote on the 8th, the “Takaichi whirlwind” swept across Japan, with the LDP winning two-thirds of the seats in the House of Representatives, and together with the Ishin Party's seats, holding an absolute supermajority of three-quarters. China's diplomacy toward Japan turned into a massive overreach and a massive failure, with pressure from both inside and outside falling squarely on Xi Jinping, who has “personally commanded, personally deployed, and personally overseen” the campaign. Now, having secured an even larger public mandate, Sanae Takaichi is set to lead Japan toward a “normalization” of the nation and its national defense -- checking Xi Jinping's expansionist ambitions and adding a new variable to any PLA attempt to seize Taiwan by force. Most notable of all is that “if Taiwan has an emergency, Japan acts first” is exactly what Washington wishes to see -- hence Trump's endorsement of Takaichi before the vote, and his renewed declaration, after her landslide victory, that he will always stand by the Japanese people, along with his anticipation of welcoming Sanae Takaichi to the White House on March 19. By contrast, the chaos of Taiwan's opposition parties has provoked dissatisfaction in Washington, seeing it as playing with fire, while giving Beijing a glimpse of a window of opportunity to swallow Taiwan by exploiting its democracy -- forming a sharp contrast with Japan.

Over the past two years, Taiwan has been mired in a standoff between the ruling and opposition camps, with the KMT and the Taiwan People's Party together holding a legislative majority -- ranging from undermining the constitution and disrupting governance, to blocking the special defense budget bill ten times over, to refusing to meet or communicate with President Lai, all while cozying up closely to China's united-front department for Taiwan affairs, making no effort to disguise their stance of “welcoming China, rejecting the United States.” Under these circumstances, the native, pragmatic pro-independence government that has now occupied the presidential office for three consecutive terms has already had its hands full, and its strength divided, simply coping with the chaos in a legislature controlled by the KMT and the TPP -- let alone finding room to advance any agenda of “seeking independence.” The CCP recently convened a work conference on Taiwan affairs, its so-called policy of “firmly supporting patriotic and pro-unification forces on the island, resolutely striking down forces seeking Taiwan independence, and opposing outside interference” revealing just how patiently and methodically it is pursuing its strategy. Even the harsh sentencing of Jimmy Lai serves as a bargaining chip in dealings with Trump, and as an opening act for the “one country, two systems, Taiwan formula.” As a result, this year's local elections pose yet another major test for Taiwan.

Whatever winds may blow from any direction, Xi Jinping's ambition is crystal clear: to secure a fourth term in 2027 without question, and thereby remain in power for the long haul, free of any doubt. Under this ambition, the real influence of Party elders, the balance among internal factions, the relationship between the Party and the gun, and the community of “red family” descendants may all undergo transformation within an even more concentrated power structure. Centralized rule has never feared those it rules over -- what it fears is internal conflict at the very top, and this remains Xi Jinping's greatest challenge at present.

Since the downfall of Zhang and Liu, Xi Jinping has seldom left Beijing, a detail that gives off an unusual scent. The “two sessions” in March may be the next point worth watching. Should Xi Jinping's cleverness backfire and undo his own plans, an anticlimactic ending cannot be ruled out. And should Xi Jinping succeed in completing his grand imperial project, all that will remain is the question of succession. Will he, like emperors of old, “abdicate” and pass power to a trusted comrade? Or will China move from “Party rule under heaven” to “family rule under heaven,” giving rise to a “House of Xi” dynasty? The future remains uncertain, and China has arrived, in just this way, at a crossroads where the traffic signals have failed.